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The long-festering disputes with Colombia over the Panama Canal con-
tinued, and Colombia refused the proposals of the U.S. to settle several of
the disputes for $10,000,000. It will be recalled that in 1920 the U.S. did
pay Colombia $25,000,000 while still bound by a treaty that guaranteed the
sovereignty of Colombia over the isthmus. The Committee's report
lamented the fact that the year had been one of many unresolved interna-
tional disputes.
The writer started this research with the idea of including in this paper
the history of the section from 1878 to 1933, the year of amalgamation of all
of the international groups in the ABA into the Section of International and
Comparative Law. As interesting as history is, there is a limit to the dose
that can be swallowed at one time. Therefore this is being cut off at thirty-
five years with the hope that when the next episode appears, members of the
section will have the stomach for more.
VICTOR C. FOLSOM
Former Section Chairman
Implications of the Iranian Assets
Case for American Business*
On July 2, 1981, the last day of its 1980 Term, the U.S. Supreme Court
handed down its decision in the Iranian assets case, Dames & Moore v.
Regan, No. 80-2078. Dames & Moore, a Los Angeles-based engineering
firm, contended that President Carter had exceeded his constitutional
authority when, without the approval of Congress, he agreed (1) to termi-
nate all litigation brought by American companies in American courts
against the Iranian government and its agencies and to remit the plaintiffs
to an International Tribunal of uncertain effectiveness and (2) to vacate
attachments by American plaintiffs on $3-$4 billion worth of Iranian assets
in the United States and to transfer such assets to Iran free and clear of
American claims. (By contrast, the International Tribunal was to have a
security fund of only $1 billion.) Two federal district judges held that the
President had acted unconstitutionally in entering into these agreements.'
*Editor's Note: Mr. Howard argued the Iranian assets case before the Supreme Court.
'Marschalk Co. v. Iran National Airlines Corp., No. 79 Civ. 7035 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y., June
11, 1981); Electronic Data Systems Corp., Iran v. Social Security Organization of the Govern-
ment of Iran, No. CA3-79-218-F (N.D. Tex., June 8, 1981).
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However, the majority of lower federal courts found the President's acts to
be within his authority, and a unanimous Supreme Court agreed.
The result reached by the Supreme Court, and the rationale underlying
that result, make clear that American businesses engaged in commercial
transactions with foreign governments assume the risk of adverse economic
effects resulting from diplomatic agreements entered into by our govern-
ment. The Supreme Court flatly held that the President can utilize the eco-
nomic interests of American citizens as bargaining chips in international
negotiations, although the government may subsequently have to compen-
sate the Americans injured by presidential action. Whether or not such
compensation turns out to be meaningful in the Iranian case will have to
await a later court decision. For now, about all that American businesses
can do is to recognize the risks of entering into business transactions with
foreign governments and to take these risks into account in pricing the
goods and services that they contract to deliver.
The Iranian Litigation
Following the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran on November
4, 1979, and the freezing of Iranian assets in this country by executive order
on November 14, 1979, approximately 400 American plaintiffs commenced
litigation in U.S. courts against the government of Iran and various of its
agencies, seeking damages of some $3-$4 billion in the aggregate.2 In the
case of Dames & Moore, it sought to collect approximately $3.5 million in
unpaid invoices rendered for professional services in connection with a
study of potential nuclear power plant sites in Iran.
Most of the 400 lawsuits were jurisdictionally premised upon the provi-
sions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. Sections 1330,
1602-11, enacted in 1976, which confers on U.S. courts personal and subject
matter jurisdiction over commercial disputes between American citizens
and foreign governments based on acts or activities in, or causing a direct
effect in, the United States. Prior to enactment of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, claims of American businesses against foreign govern-
ments were generally resolved, not by litigation before the courts, but by
negotiation with the foreign power conducted by the State Department.
This resulted from the fact that, if a foreign government was sued in the
United States by an American plaintiff, and if the foreign government could
persuade the State Department (for whatever reason) to enter a claim of
sovereign immunity in the American court, our courts routinely honored
such claims. 3 Once the immunity claim was honored by the courts, the
American plaintiff had no practical remedy against the foreign government
other than negotiation by the State Department on the plaintiffs behalf.
Moreover, even though the State Department adopted a formal policy in
2A few such suits were filed before the embassy seizure and asset freeze.
'See, e.g., Exparle Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
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1952 of not entering immunity claims in purely commercial disputes, that
policy was not followed in practice, and diplomatic considerations fre-
quently determined whether or not an immunity claim was made.
4
The purpose of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was to take com-
mercial disputes between American citizens and foreign governments out of
the hands of the State Department and place them in the hands of the
courts.5 No immunity would be available as a matter of law, and the State
Department was thus relieved-as it asked to be--of the pressure brought
to bear by foreign governments to make claims of immunity based on dip-
lomatic considerations.6 Henceforth, American commercial claims against
foreign governments were to be litigated on their merits, not resolved on
diplomatic considerations.7
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act not only abrogated sovereign
immunity in commercial disputes, it also provided-mostly for the first
time-for service of process, attachment, and execution against the property
of foreign countries. Under these provisions, many of the American plain-
tiffs in the Iranian case obtained judicial attachments on Iranian property in
this country-said to total about $3-$4 billion. To the extent that the
attached property was of a kind that could be quickly removed from the
United States, some of these attachments might not have been successfully
levied if it had not been for prior presidential freeze of Iranian assets. A
great deal of the attached property, however, was not quickly removable
from the United States. For example, Dames & Moore had attached a par-
tially constructed Boeing 747 in a hangar in Everett, Washington, which
was being built for delivery to Iran, and Iran's contract rights relating to
that aircraft. Other creditors attached such assets as paintings on loan to
the National Gallery and boatloads of Iranian property sitting in American
harbors awaiting shipment.
The Hostage Deal
Against this background, President Carter, on January 19, 1981, entered
into two executive agreements-the so-called Algerian Declarations-that
were unprecedented, though ultimately found authorized. In order to
secure the release of our hostages, the President agreed to "terminate" all
American lawsuits against Iran and its agencies. Despite the fact that the
400 lawsuits pending in U.S. courts (with all of their procedural safeguards)
'See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 6-10, 12 (1976) (hereinafter FSIA House
Report), reprinted in (1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604, 6605-608, 6610 (citations
hereinafter are to U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS); Hearings on HR. 11315 Before the Sub-
comm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 25, 34-35 (June 2 and 4, 1976) (hereinafter 1976 House Committee
Hearings).
FSIA House Report at 6605-607, 6610-11, 6613; see generally 1976 House Committee
Hearings.
61976 House Committee Hearings at 25, 29, 34-35, 59; see FSIA House Report at 6605-606.
"See FSIA House Report at 6605-606; 1976 House Committee Hearings at 24-27, 30-31.
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were authorized by an express congressional grant of jurisdiction, the plain-
tiffs, or at least some of them, were to be remitted to an International Tribu-
nal which the United States and Iran agreed to establish. The Tribunal was
to be made up of one-third Iranians, one-third Americans, and one-third
from other countries. How well this Tribunal will function-indeed
whether it will function at all-was by no means clear in January-nor is it
clear now. To date, Iran and the United States have each selected three
arbitrators, and they in turn have selected the three other arbitrators; little
more has been done. Estimates are that the Tribunal, if it functions at all,
may take from five to fifteen years to complete its work.
In addition to agreeing to terminate litigation in American courts, Presi-
dent Carter agreed to wipe out the American plaintiffs' security by vacating
all attachments on Iranian property and returning to Iran, free of any
American claims, all Iranian property in the United States. The only con-
solation to the American companies which had attached Iranian assets was
that $1 billion of the $3-$4 billion returned would go into a security fund
for disposition by the International Tribunal. Although Iran agreed to put
additional monies into this fund in the future, this promise is totally
unsecured, and American businesses can take little comfort from conten-
tions by our government that Iran will surely put in the additional funds in
order to protect its image in the international community. Iran has shown
little concern about that image in the recent past.
For most American plaintiffs, with lawsuits pending against Iran in U.S.
courts and adequate assets attached to satisfy potential judgments, Presi-
dent Carter's agreement with the Iranians was a disaster.8 The plaintiffs
lost both their American lawsuits and their security; in return they were
given, at best, an opportunity to take their claim to a remote Tribunal of
uncertain effectiveness with apparently insufficient funds to pay the claims
before it. Moreover, plaintiffs with lawsuits based on contracts with certain
forum selection clauses requiring litigation in Iran (clauses that would very
likely be held unenforceable in United States courts) could not even take
their claims to the International Tribunal. For such plaintiffs, litigation in
Tehran appeared to be their only remedy.
Some government spokespersons-adopting President Carter's "no ran-
som" rhetoric-have attempted to portray the Algerian Declarations as
actually putting American claimants in a better position than they were in
before the deal was struck.9 It is difficult to understand how American liti-
gants with their cases in U.S. courts and $3-$4 billion available for satisfac-
tion of their claims could be better off with their claims remitted to an
uncertain and remote Tribunal with only $1 billion available as security.
'An exception to this generalization is the major U.S. banks-many of whose loans to Iran
were paid off as part of the hostage deal.
9We are asked to believe in effect that the Iranians offered to give our hostages back for
nothing and the United States refused to take them until the Iranians would make additional
concessions.
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The Algerian Declarations undoubtedly represent a diplomatic triumph by
skillful American negotiators; but it demeans that accomplishment to pre-
tend that no price was paid to secure the return of our hostages.
The Supreme Court's Decision
In its decision, the Supreme Court held that, while American businesses
might have a claim against the U.S. government for a taking of property
without just compensation, President Carter was within his constitutional
authority, even acting without Congress, in entering into the Algerian Dec-
larations and carrying them out. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
made two sweeping holdings. First, the Court held that a 1977 statute, the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which had lifted certain
obtuse and complex language from an old World War I statute, was to be
interpreted literally, allowing the President in times of an international
emergency unlimited power over assets in which any foreign government,
or foreign citizen, had any interest--even power to dispose of those assets in
a manner contrary to the interests of American creditors.' 0 Under this stat-
utory grant of power, the Supreme Court held, President Carter had validly
voided American attachments in Iranian property and had the power to
transfer the $3-$4 billion in Iranian assets out of the country, shielded from
all claims of American citizens."
Second, with regard to terminating lawsuits in American courts and
remitting the plaintiffs to an International Tribunal, the Supreme Court
upheld this portion of the Algerian Declarations as an exercise of an alleged
long-established practice of "executive settlements" of private claims
against foreign governments-a practice allegedly acquiesced in by Con-
gress by its silence. 12 Dames & Moore had contended that the history of
executive settlements before the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunites Act was irrelevant, because American businesses with claims
against foreign governments had previously had no way of getting these
claims resolved in court, and settlement by assistance from the State
Department was the only real remedy. While a practice of executive assist-
ance to private American claimants in resolving their commercial disputes
against foreign governments had existed before the enactment of the For-
"Section 1702 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701 el
seq., which defines "Presidential authorities," provides, in part:
At the times and to the extent specified in Section 202 150 U.S.C. § 1701], the President
may, under such regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or
otherwise . ...
Investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisi-
tion, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdraw.l, transportation, importation or exporta-
tion of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or
transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has
any interest; by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.
"Slip op. at 11-16.
'
2Slip op. at 16-30.
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eign Sovereign Immunities Act, this practice had dried up after enactment
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (although executive settlements of
certain other types of claims outside the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act-not commercial claims-had continued). At no time in American his-
tory had a President ever settled, over the objection of the claimant, a claim
of an American citizen validly pending before an American court.
The Supreme Court, however, held that executive power to settle com-
mercial claims of American citizens against foreign governments survived
the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Thus, if the State
Department had desired in 1976, as it then said it did, to be freed from
pressure from foreign governments to resolve private commercial claims
based upon diplomatic considerations, the Department certainly did not
succeed. The Iranian case became exactly what the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act was supposed to avoid-a situation where a foreign govern-
ment, illegally holding Americans hostage, successfully pressured the U.S.
government to compromise the claims of American citizens in American
courts. 13
The Possibility of Compensation
Dames & Moore also argued in the Supreme Court that, even if the Presi-
dent had been authorized to do what he did, his acts constituted a taking of
property for which the plaintiffs were entitled, under the Fifth Amendment
of the Constitution, to just compensation. Conceding that some aspects of
the taking question might be premature, Dames & Moore pressed the Court
to decide, at a minimum, that there was a remedy for any such taking in the
Court of Claims. Until the Supreme Court argument in the Dames &
Moore case, the government had suggested that there was no such remedy
because of a certain statutory exception to the jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims.' 4 During oral argument, Solicitor General-Designate Rex Lee
conceded, under tough questioning from the Justices, that the statutory
exception did not apply and that there would be a remedy in the Court of
Claims for any taking of property that resulted from implementation of the
Algerian Declarations. In its opinion, the Supreme Court expressly
adopted this concession as its holding.' 5
3The result was remarkably similar to that in Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, 197 F. Supp. 710
(E.D. Va.), afd, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961), where the State Department entered a claim of
immunity in an American court in order to get a hijacked airliner back from Cuba. The
enactors of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act agreed that this situation should never be
repeated. See, e.g., 1976 House Committee Hearings at 67, 90 ("the so-called flexibility the
State Department has under any present practice, if it is flexibility, is achieved at a price that is
paid by some individual citizen or corporation. That is not the way this government does
business and it is not the way we ought to do business."). Ironically, the Supreme Court has
now read the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in such a way as to allow history to repeat
itself once again.
'28 U.S.C. § 1502.
"Shp op. at 30-31.
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While this portion of the Supreme Court's opinion no doubt gives some
comfort to the American plaintiffs, it is not clear just how meaningful this
taking remedy may be. The Supreme Court held in a footnote that Presi-
dent Carter's vacating of the attachments and his transferring of Iranian
assets out of the country was not itself a taking. If courts should later hold
that removing the lawsuits from U.S. courts was a taking of property, one
can fairly predict that the government will counter by arguing that the
value of the property taken-which the government will characterize as a
lawsuit without any security or property to execute upon-is minimal. This
argument, if accepted, could render the taking remedy a charade. Whether
the courts will allow the government to gut the taking claim in this fashion
remains for another opinion.
What Can American Businesses Do?
Under the Supreme Court's decision, unless Congress should intervene
with new statutory provisions (which Congress does not appear to be
inclined to do), the President is allowed virtually unlimited power (1) to
dispose of foreign assets in any way that the President deems fit in the con-
text of an international emergency (including removing those assets from
the reach of American creditors) and (2) to "settle" any claim of an Ameri-
can citizen against a foreign government, even a purely commercial claim
pending in an American court.
Under these circumstances, American. businesses that choose to enter into
commercial transactions with foreign governments must recognize that they
are taking the risk that disputes that arise in such transactions may not be
resolved in a fair manner on the merits; rather diplomatic considerations
may take priority. Any foreign fund or property held as security for the
resolution of a claim or dispute may be, in effect, seized by the President.
This would be true even if funds were held in an American bank from the
outset of the business arrangement. Even letters of credit drawn on Ameri-
can banks could be bargained away in an "executive settlement." If Ameri-
can businesses were to provide in their contracts with foreign governments
that disputes are to be resolved solely by litigation in American courts, the
President could give that point away as well in any settlement, if the foreign
policy interests of the United States so dictated. While the injured business
might have a taking claim against the United States government, that claim
may or may not prove meaningful.
The power afforded the President under Dames & Moore v. Regan is so
sweeping that there is little that American businesses can do to protect
themselves--except to build a risk factor into the price of the goods or serv-
ices to be supplied. And hope for the best.
C. STEPHEN HOWARD
